A government working against itself - III

There has been little or no proper debate of the spiraling violence since 1999. The discourse is locked on a set of assumptions that have hung on our necks like albatrosses since the 1950s.  We really need to abandon the politics of blaming everything on leaders and ordinary citizens from every Region other than our own, while simultaneously exonerating ourselves and our own Regional leaders from any responsibility.

Many react to the current insurgency in the north of our country by blaming "Northerners" and "Northern Leaders". But the problem of insecurity, and the sources of the problem of insecurity are pan-Nigerian and pan-Federal; the things that cause or make it easy for violence of small or large magnitude to happen in one part of Nigeria are the same things that cause or make it easy for it to happen anywhere else in Nigeria ... and every part of Nigeria suffers as a consequence of the dysfunction in or absence of structures meant to prevent, combat and/or ameliorate violence.

Sociocultural diversity is not the problem. People say African countries would be more peaceful if colonialism had not forced us together, but if that were true Somalia would be the most peaceful country in Africa. I suppose they would counter-argue that Somalia's clans were forced together, to which I would respond that the clans were fighting each other before they were forced together, so you can't blame the conflicts in the Horn on their being forced together.

In Nigeria, violence has flared up everywhere from Ife-Modakeke in the Southwest and Aguleri-Umuleri in the Southeast to the incessant farmers-versus-herders murders in the Middle Belt. You may think these many, many, too many incidents are somehow different from what is happening in Maiduguri, but from the perspectives of the families who have to bury their relatives there is no difference in the consequences of shared vulnerability to unchecked violence.

None of us are safe.

Two acquaintances of mine have been in the vicinity of armed robberies; one occurred within sight of a police checkpoint, while my friend who escaped the second incident came upon a checkpoint not too far from where the robbers were operation. In both cases, the police officers flat out refused to do anything to intervene. In a separate incident reported in the media, the robbers left the scene after operating without challenge for hours, but then returned later to riddle with bullets the home of a man who had called the police after they left, begging the question of how they knew he had called and how they knew who had called. Believe it or not, the reaction of these specific police officers to these specific armed robberies is indicative of our Federal Republic's incapacity to react to what we call "communal violence".

No one is perfect, I know, and no country can perfectly prevent violence, I know that too. But my problem is we are not even genuinely trying.  Again, I point to Jos and to the farmers-versus-herders violence, predictable and persistent -- tell me, has anything really been done to try to bring these situations under control?  Forget the promises, the assurances, the warnings and the rest of the usual governmental reaction to outbreaks of violence (including but not limited to "panel of inquiry", "consultation with stakeholders/elders", "Joint Task Force", and "sack the NSA). Look at the situation over the last 13 years, focus if you must on specific long-running issues like Jos, and be honest about whether you think the governments at all three tiers have so much as lifted a finger in the direction of real, substantive effort at problem-solving.

I am not even sure they would know what to do even if they desired to do something, but I question whether they really desire to do anything.  Fixing the problem runs contrary to the interests of the people in charge of fixing the problem. They profit from divide-and-rule politics, so bringing our sociocultural communities together is anathema to them. The benefit from the absence of effective law enforcement, so reforming and improving the public security agencies is anathema to them.

And even if they suddenly experienced a Paul-at-Damascus conversion, they have spent their entire lives killing any credibility they might have in terms of fixing our problems. Even if they honestly tried to bring warring factions to the table of peace, one or the other or both of the factions would not trust them, because they are firmly identified with one or the other faction, or with an outside faction that both warring factions distrust.



As long as we keep acting as though the problem is a problem of "them" and not a problem of "all of us" then all of us will remain at risk.  If the federal and state governments (and the citizenry) are dormant when ethnic/regional/"vigilance" militia like the OPC and Bakassi Boys appoint themselves judges, jurors and executioners of Nigerian citizens, what makes you think the same federal and state governments (and citizens) will suddenly show signs of institutional capacity to effectively stop with insurgents in Maiduguri doing the same thing?

Our governments at all three tiers are supposed to be doing things that make us safer, but instead they do things that make it safer for violent groups to operate (not just insurgents and militia, but armed robbers as well), while simultaneously and deliberately  making it difficult for the security service to effectively curtail insecurity.  They do these things in the open, sometimes with the acquiescence of we the citizens.

Almost everyone praises Lagos Governor Babatunde Fashola. But Fashola is part of ex-Governor Bola Tinubu's political machine. Tinubu, like the late Lamidi Adedibu in Ibadan, distributes money (extracted illegally and semi-legally from the government) to Area Boys and other thuggish elements in Lagos. The hired thugs work for Tinubu when it is time to control electoral outcomes, intimidate political opponents, and exert control over the vast informal sectors of the Lagos economy. With Tinubu's endorsement, these gangs have taken over Road Transporters' Unions in Lagos, and enrich themselves by collecting "dues" from bus, taxi and okada drivers. Every once in a while, these gangs engage in violent territorial battle for control of the lucrative union dues, and each time this happens, the media rather laughably describes them as clashes between rival unions. Click on the links to read of some of the factions' violent clashes over territory, influence and "toll" collection thus far this year, in January (no fewer than seven dead), in February (local police accused of supporting one side in the clash) and in May (one dead, several injured).

This is more or less what happened in the Niger-Delta, where the so-called "militant" armies began as groups of political thugs recruited by regional politicians to seize direct control of territory they could trade during elections in exchange for post-election favours.  Indeed, these thugs were (and are) so good at their job that the Peoples Democratic Party won (and wins) elections in Rivers and Bayelsa with the kind of margins unheard of anywhere outside Nguema's Equatorial Guinea.  Where Tinubu's goons squeeze small money from Road Transporters' Unions, their counterparts in the Niger-Delta discovered Big Money could be made by blasting a whole in an oil pipeline and stealing the crude. When the politicians stopped paying them in between elections, they started making fortunes from oil theft.  The men who command these militia are now dollar multi-millionaires with mansions at home and abroad. Mind you, they are careful to shunt a share of their profits to the politicians and to some of the Armed Forces brass. Indeed, what made MEND and the other "militant" groups militarily difficult to beat is the support and information they were getting from many of the same leaders (in the Niger-Delta and in Abuja) who were in theory responsible for hunting them down.

No one really knows what is behind the insurgency in the North, as noted in this cartoon by Asuquo E.B.:

 

But beyond the usual 1950s-style back-and-forth rhetoric, a senior PDP politician (i.e. not the most reliable of sources) from Borno State accused the governor of cutting a deal with the movement that later became the insurgent group to help him win the 2003 elections.

Somewhat more credibly (but not that much more), retired General Jerry Useni mentioned in passing that on one occasion when he was been driven through the streets of Maiduguri with the Governor, he had told the governor that he had to do something about the presence of so many poverty-stricken young men visible on the streets lest it become a problem in the future.  According to Useni, the Governor replied that it was good that there were so many young, jobless men, because when it came to time for election, they would be available for use in manipulating the outcome.

I want to make clear that I am not personally accusing the Governor of creating or starting the insurgent group. What I am saying is I believe that modus operandi of the governor, like that of every other governor, and of all of our presidents, lends itself to the emergence and strengthening of armed groups of one kind or another ... groups which initially prove useful to politicians, but then become independent operators, beyond the control of the politicians, at which point anything can happen.

Indeed, while I am on the topic, I know people who argue that the financial relationships between governors and gangs are necessary, because if the governors don't pay them, they will find ways to pay themselves. But how is this the solution to the problem?  And haven't they noticed that this "solution" has been tried before in other countries, and only ever gave armed groups enough time to build up their strength to the point of not needing to fear the absence of governmental acquiescence?