Amalgamation Day in Lagos, 1914

Amalgamation Day in Lagos, 1914

11 January, 2011

The mooted military intervention in Cote d'Ivoire

What you have in the Cote d'Ivoire are two large armies led by two men.

Having grown rapidly over the last 17 years, the "official" army, the militia supporting Laurent Gbagbo, is now the second-largest in West Africa by number of enlisted me. I am not sure of the numbers of the rebel New Forces, but I suspect they have enough force at least to balance the "government" army (or the war would have resumed).

So long as Gbagbo and Ouattara can each count on tens of thousands of soldiers to back his claim, neither man was ever going to accept defeat in an election. If you think Ouattara would have gracefully accepted defeat, had he been declared the loser, you must not have noticed what has been going on these last 17 years. There are credible suggestions that both men "manipulated" results in areas under the control of their respective armies; and even pie-in-the-sky optimists have queried the rationale of holding an election in what is still effectively a divided war zone (albeit one with a firm ceasefire).

If Gbagbo does not step down, the New Forces will not relinquish their control of the North and will not recognize his government. This much everyone acknowledges.

Unsurprisingly, no one is similarly acknowledging the fact that the 50,000-strong "official" government army is just as unlikely to accept Ouattara as its president.

The "international community" (i.e. a small group of Western European, North American and Japanese countries) has been threatening Gbagbo, trying to get him to step down for Ouattara. I personally don't think Gbagbo, Ouattara or Bedie is the solution to the Ivoirien crisis, but Ouattara is clearly the favourite of the "international community", having previously held high office at the IMF, at the BCEAO and in the neo-colonial Houphouet-Boigny government.

The "international community" may or may not have persuaded the Economic Community of West African States to back their line.

I rather suspect ECOWAS leaders couldn't care less about "democracy" in Cote d'Ivoire.

For one thing, the majority of ECOWAS member states are either undemocratic or pseudo-democratic. An organization that recognizes Yahya Jammeh of Gambia and Faure Gnassingbe of Togo can hardly presume to comment on the democratic virtues (or lack thereof) of anyone. Even the likes of Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria can hardly hold their heads up with pride and say they were properly elected (remember, Goodluck Jonathan is in office because of the monumentally undemocratic 2007 Nigerian Elections).

For another thing, the only matter of principle on which all African presidents can agree on is their own self-preservation, and as such, the idea of removing a sitting African president should ever lose office. And for something as "trivial" as not being democratic?

Thing is, the "international community" and ECOWAS have taken to declaring the existence of a military option for forcing Gbagbo from office.

I am not sure anyone takes the threat of military force seriously.

I don't.

Gbagbo doesn't seem to either.

Three (maybe four) members of "the international community" have deployable military forces of the sort that could intervene militarily in Cote d'Ivoire. Of this shortlist, all except France are tied up in other conflicts they consider strategically more important. All, including France, face voting publics who (a) are tired of war; (b) are uninterested in and possibly entirely unaware of Cote d'Ivoire and/or its crisis; and (c) do not think Cote d'Ivoire and its problems are worth the life of even one of their soldiers. France, the most likely "international community" member to intervene, is widely disliked in Cote d'Ivoire and across much of West and Central Africa, as well well as in Rwanda, which these days is considered East Africa.

The "international community" could (in theory) use bombs and long-range missiles in place of troops on the ground, but I suspect a key outcome of such an act would be greater hatred of Ouattara, France and the "international community" among any Ivoiriens not emotionally committed to Ouattara. The sight of a partially bombed-out Abidjan wouldn't play well in the rest of Africa either; because the average African does not hold a particularly high opinion of Gbagbo, Bedie or Ouattara, the average African does not thing any of them is so important he is worth bombing Abidjan for.

In fact, that is one of the sources of political apathy among the African masses, the sense that none of the politicians or political factions is worth fighting for. And you can't say the fight is for "democracy" because the masses know the politicians and factions do not believe in "democracy". Everyone sees Gbagbo using undemocratic tactics against Bedie and Ouattara; everyone has forgotten that Bedie and Ouattara were part of the Felix Houphouet-Boigny regime that used similarly undemocratic tactics against Gbagbo (back when Gbagbo was Houphouet's only substantial opposition). At the end of the day, all three of them have, are, and would use undemocratic means to keep themselves in office, and the people of Africa know it.

One gets the impression that the "international community" will get around these various handicaps by leaning on ECOWAS to either mount this putative military expedition, or to at least to provide the visible military muscle that can be pointed at to back up the verbal threats. As such there have been ECOWAS conferences (most recently in Abuja), and lots of vague talk about all options still being on the table, including the military option. This is a link to a briefing on ECOWAS involvement in the Ivoirien crisis.

I doubt any ECOWAS member state is interested in an armed intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. But I equally doubt any of them has the guts to say so to the "international community". Even without the prior experience of ECOMOG in the Liberian and Sierra Leonian wars as a guide, the assumption behind any suggestion of an "ECOWAS" intervention in Cote d'Ivoire is that it would be a Nigerian intervention in all but name -- and Nigeria has NO INTEREST whatsoever in doing such a thing. Of course, the Nigerian federal government will never openly say it has no interest in an Ivorien intervention; Presidents Obasanjo, Yar'Adua (RIP) and Jonathan have all continually promised the "international community" they would send soldiers to Somalia, but I don't think we ever will, nor do I think Obasanjo, Yar'Adu and Jonathan ever had any intention of doing so.

All things considered, a West African military intervention to dethrone Gbagbo and enthrone Ouattara is unlikely at the moment.

Still, there was an interesting opinion piece in the Guardian today, discussing what Nigeria should or shouldn't do if it is planning on a military intervention in Cote d'Ivoire.

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