Federalism and Africa

A quick note on politics elsewhere in Africa.

We Nigerians have been "federalists" since before regaining our freedom from British imperialism. Indeed we were federalists even before the British yoke; the geographically expansive Sokoto Caliphate was not a unitary kingdom, nor was it an "empire" in the classic sense. You could call it a confederation, but it might have been more accurate to call it an association. Many of the "emirates" that were part of this confederal association bear a striking resemblance to some of the "states" that currently make up the Nigerian federal republic.

In any case we have been the (imperfect) torch-bearers for federalism in Africa. And inasmuch as our federalist-republican system has been very imperfect, the constitutional and practical autonomy enjoyed by second-tier units in Nigeria (regions and later states) has always exceeded the constitutional (but not necessarily practical) autonomy of second-tier units elsewhere in Africa. I say not necessarily practical, because in some countries (those at war and/or those where the national government in particularly weak) administrators of the second-tier entities enjoy a freedom of (often despotic) action that belies the constitutional limitations imposed in their unitary systems.

Add to this the tendency for African countries in the last half-century to have one-party states, military-led governments, civilianj-led dictatorships, and de facto single-party-dominant states (masquerading as multi-party states) and the tendency toward centralism is magnified by the lack of a serious opposition and the citizens' lack of ability to change their government at the polls.

In the 1990s, Ethiopia ostensibly adopted federalism as a constitutional principle, but in practice a repressive national government (borderline civilian dictatorship) and a ruling political alliance that brooks no opposition (borderline one-party state) creates a situation where true federalism is an impossiblitiy.

Sudan is also ostensibly federal, but this is legalese, fine words designed to mask what is in effect a ceasefire line with two "national" governments on either side looking at each other with suspicion. I worry about Sudan for MANY reasons, not the least of which is my fear for this "referendum" they are supposed to hold on contiuned national unity.

Ironically, Sudan is the proof of the point I want to make in this post.

Most countries in Africa (Sudan inclusive) should have adopted true, real, substantive federalism the very moment they freed themselves from the colonial jackboot. The biggest should have been federations from the start, and the bigger-than-average should have been federal republics. The mid-sized countries should have devolved substantial autonomy to the provinces or districts (whatever they called them), giving them self-government just short of federalism. And the smallest African countries should have had self-governing municipalities.

The excuse for centralization was always that the countries were so diverse, they would fall apart without it, but centralization proved to be the divisive factor in early post-colonial Africa -- most spectacularly so in Sudan.

Nigeria is proof that adopting federal principles is not in and of itself sufficient, but centralization was never the solution for the absence of these factors. This false dichotomy is one of those things I criticized in my immediately prior post to this one, in this case the idea bandied about Africa in those days that federalism and devolution (and multi-party democracy) equalled break-up while centralization (and one-party state of civilian-military dictatorship) equalled unity.

What Nigeria needed to do then (and sadly still need to do now) is create the absent factors; not to mention recognize that the three-region structure was as inappropriate as the 36-state structure is now. The Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers provinces should not have been in the Eastern Region (and for the record, I believe we would not have lost Bamenda and Buea to Cameroun if the voters in that referendum had believed they would have been part of a C-O-R-B-B region). The Middle-Belt, the old Gongola State and the old Borno State should not have been in the Northern Region. And obviously the Mid-West should not have been in the West.

Now this may seem like simplistic statements affirming things that we all believe, but we need to recognize that the fact that these changes did not happen on the surface says a lot about the political and socio-cultural climate of Nigeria beneath the surface in the 1950s and 1960s before the Civil War. Indeed, the reason (and method) for the creation of the Mid-West had nothing to do with these underlying currents finally moving in a positive direction. One of these days I will have to write a book (or something) about how the build-up to violence and Civil War actually began in the 1950s and not in the mid-1960s, but I digress.

In any case, Nigeria's experience does not take away from the fact that Africa's countries need a lot more federalism and devolution than is present today. Indeed, it is important to note that federalism in and of itself does not fix the governance problem, but it is the ideal place to start.

Tanzania's national government policy toward Zanzibar (and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi's approach to the Civic United Front) is driven mostly by its fear that Zanzibari autonomy will lead to Zanzibari independence. On the flip-side, Zanzibari opposition politicians are well aware that the CCM and national government prefer a centralized unitary state with a one-party or single-party-dominant system, and are inclined to pull away from central control if only to maintain what autonomy they currently have. Tanzania is geographically larger than Nigeria, if only one-third as populous, and life would be a lot easier on both sides if the mainland regions enjoyed the same kind of autonomy as Zanzibar. For one thing the Zanzibaris would feel more secure about their status. For another thing, the national government would not be so worried about what would then be a normal relationship with all of its second-tier entities (as opposed to the anomaly of its current relationship with Zanzibar versus the rest of the country). And it would improve governance, as the currently under-developed regions of the mainland can move forward to pursue development plans of their own rather than waiting for the slow-slow-slow of Dar Es Salaam to plan for all of them.

The same thing goes for Kenya. The ethnic violence that followed their last election is just the most destructive manifestation of currents that have been running through their society for decades. In any case, there is too much to gain and to lose from controling the national government treasury, which does tend to promote dictatorships (Kenyatta, Moi), and electoral manipulation. Kenya needs first consolidation (of districts and provinces) and then responsible devolution to the new, more sensible second- and third-tier entities.

The same logic could be applied to so many other countries (including West Africans like Liberia and Sierra Leone, where discrepancies in development between coastal capitals and interior provinces are part of sad national stories), but it is particularly apt for the East African countries because they are the best examples of one of the more problematic traits in Africa.

Kenya has not reformed itself or devolved power. Uganda has not reformed itself or devolved power. Tanzania has not reformed itself or devolved power. Rwanda and Burundi are still coming to terms with "ethnic diversity" that extends only to TWO groups, both of whom speak THE SAME LANGUAGE.

Yet all these countries are busily trying to construct a new layer of government on top of the existing layers.

This is the funny thing with most countries in Africa. All of the biggest obstacles to our growth are downward and domestic, yet all of the activity is upwards and international. And they are not even "fixing" anything, just using the fancy new bodies as a sort of

I mean, exactly how are people going to guarantee democracy and constitutionalism in a giant East Africa, when they can not figure out how to get it to work in a small Burundi? If they think more complexity would make it easier, they need only look at Nigeria; I daresay their three big EAC members are already acting the way our three big regions did in the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, simplicity does not make it easier either, as Somalia proves.


An Africa comprised of properly governed/administered countries operating under a pared-down, narrow-focused, built-for-specific-purpose African Union is sensible. Creating behemoth structures for the AU, ECOWAS, EAC, etc, and giving them all grandiose aims and goals is pointless when it all comes down to an alliance between a large number of internally-fractious, poorly governed countries.

But I am getting more than a little off point.

I look at South Africa and I do not understand why they don't just go all the way and adopt a federal system. There too, like elsewhere in Africa, the dominant politicians are far too interested in being in control of everything, and far too suspicious of allowing even a modicum of breathing room to ostensibly autonomous entities.

I don't get it. What is with this addiction to excess centralization? It is not a socio-cultural thing, as most of our precolonial states (including the kingdoms and empires) were decentralized, albeit to varying degress. Yes, some degree of consolidation is a help, but there is a happy medium between too much decentralization and too much centralization.

We need to find that happy medium. This equilibrium point will differ for different countries and different sub-regions, but we must all find that point. And we should not just write it into our constitutions, while continuing to practice despotism.