The Ivoirien affair

The genesis of the Ivoirien crisis lies in the autocracy of Felix Houphouet-Boigny. In my younger days, I used to joke to myself that there were Ivoiriens who had been born, grown up, graduated from university, got married and had children, and now those children were in school themselves and in all that while there had been no other president than Houphouet.

In a democracy, the issue of political succession is simple and straightforward. Elections are held at regular intervals, candidates follow a predetermined set of campaign rules and traditions in their efforts to seek office, and citizens make the final decision at the polls.

When there is no democracy, succession is either by designation, by inheritance, by consensus (among the top power-brokers), by an open or hidden test of strength (to the strongest man go the spoils).

The likes of Omar Bongo and Gnassingbe Eyadema set things up for their sons to succeed them, which seems to be a trend in Africa. I am not going to say anyone's name, because someone will accuse me of wishing them ill, but quite a number of Africa's older, long-serving Presidents are setting their sons up to succeed them. Outside of that, for much of the last 50 years the succession in such countries has been by a coup, or some other form of power-grab by a military, retired military or military-backed strongman (usually followed by pro-forma protests by the "international community", a rigged election to "legitimize" the regime, acceptance of the regime by the "international community", and the cycle repeats itself).

Botswana is sort of a hybrid, halfway between those countries where successors are designated (e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa) and those countries with monarchic succession. Indeed, there was a bit of a delay (decades actually) before ex-Crown Prince and current President Ian Khama ascended to the throne once held by his father, the late Sir Seretse Khama.

Felix Houphouet-Boigny had a different approach.

The Ivoirien system he ran was a sort of feudal state, a sort of clientelist state, a rentier state, a neo-colony ... well, I could go on. In any case, like all kings, King Houphouet had to balance the financial and political ambitions of his Barons. He figured if he named a successor, one of the following things would happen:

(a-i) He would become a lame-duck, as all the Barons began kissing the backside of his designated successor in order to secure the future of their baronial estates and privileges;
(a-ii) The successor could then become a rival, possibly building enough support to unseat him

OR

(b) The other Barons would lose interest in serving him because their hope (that he would name them his successor had fallen through. The failed would-be successors might then rally together around the (admittedly short-term) goal of blocking his designated successor (after which point they would probably start fighting themselves).

President Boigny had a simple answer to this conundrum: He made sure there was ZERO preparation, planning or even thinking about succession. To so much as breathe a word of it could earn you an accusation of treachery, treason and (at the very least) a ghoulish interest in the death of a man who was still living (because there could be, and would be no succession with him still alive, any discussion of succession meant you were talking about his death).

What we have witnessed over the last 17 years has been the scramble for power by the Barons of the Houphouet Era. Perhaps the most disappointing of the lot has been erstwhile President Laurent Gbagbo; as a long-time opposition leader, he suffered the brunt of Houphouet's efforts to crush democracy -- as president, Gbagbo has proceeded to act just like Houphouet, his long-time tormentor (I guess he learned nothing and forgot nothing). This being Africa, it didn't take long for the Barons to trot out ethnic, regional and religious differences as a tool for rallying thousands to their cause. Nor was it difficult for the factions to find young men willing to fight and weapons merchants willing to sell AK-47s and other tools of death.

So 17 years go by ....

.... And now the "international community" feels the solution to 17 years of wahala is forcing Gbagbo to step down and replacing him with Allasane Ouattara.

Yeah, right.

Before the crises of the last 17 years, Cote d'Ivoire had one of the smallest Armed Forces in the world. Everyone on Earth knew that if you attacked France's neo-colony Cote d'Ivoire, you were effectively declaring war on France, so Houphouet was secure inspite of his tiny military establishment.

Things have changed.

Cote d'Ivoire now has the second-largest Armed Forces in West Africa, behind only Nigeria, some 50,000+ men.

Mind you, this statistic references only the "official" Armed Forces. It does NOT included the rebel "New Forces" that hold the North of the country.

I have not been able to find any statistics on the size of the New Forces, but if one assumes they are either comparable to the official forces or at the very least slightly smaller (the facts on the ground certainly suggest the New Forces are in no way weaker than the "official" army), then we can conclude that the total number of men-under-arms in Cote d'Ivoire (including both "government" and "rebel" armies) is either roughly equivalent to the size of the Nigerian Armed Forces or is not significantly smaller .... or is bigger!

Now, depending on what you believe is the real population of Nigeria, our federal republic is either 5-times, 6-times or 7-times the population of Cote d'Ivoire. For a country that has one-sixth of our population living on a little over one-third of our geographical area to have two armies on the field equivalent in size (when added together) to our armed forces tells you just how militarized the situation in Cote d'Ivoire has become.

And the problem with these two armies is they are not really "armies" in the sense of being institutions of state. They are both private armies, political militia to be blunt, that are each personally loyal to a specific human being.

The rebel New Forces will never support Laurent Gbagbo, no matter what an "election" says. Their existence revolves around armed support for Alassane Ouattara.

Likewise the official "government" army will never support Alassane Ouattara, no matter what an "election" (or "international community") says. Their existence revolves around armed support for Laurent Gbagbo.

If the election results had said Gbagbo won, the New Forces would not have accepted it. As it stands, the elections results say Ouattara won, and the government army will not accept it.

Now when I say these armies won't accept the results of an election, I am talking about a credible election. The fact that the 2010 elections featured monumental rigging by BOTH Gbagbo and Ouattara just makes the rival armies feel all the more justified to hold their ground, gives them all that sense of victimhood they need to reconcile their actions with what they profess to be their principles.

Does the "international community" expect Ouattara to become the commander-in-chief of a government army that is more likely to attack him as it is to salute him? Even if some sort of deal is arranged to integrate the two armies, it will likely be very slow and very unsuccessful, not just because the pro-Gbagbo militia will still feel aggrieved but because Ouattara will not want to dilute or demobilize a New Forces army he will need to watch his back against the "government" army.

It is an untenable situation.

Two men hated by two armies.

Two men, each loathed by roughly half the country.

It is time for both of them to remove themselves from the stage. And they should take Henri Konan Bedie with them. In fact, everyone from the Houphouet Era, all of the Barons and anti-Barons, should just retire and go away!

A neutral caretaker, someone acceptable to both the New Forces and the government army, should be drafted to lead the government for the next five years. The Economic Community of West African States should nominate three or four or five people, and representatives of the Ivoiriens rivals should be invited to meet with ECOWAS in a room to decide on one of the nominees. For the time being, the two armies should remain in place, and the front line should be frozen where it is.

The caretaker's first task should be to stabilize the economic situation. In raising their spending on their two armies, the Ivoiriens (on both sides) have starved infrastructure and other vital sectors of funds. Cote d'Ivoire is a small country and frankly cannot afford this level of military expense. ECOWAS would have to work with the caretaker to come up with some sort of plan to demobilize both militia; his or her progress toward this goal should determine whether he or she has their term as caretaker renewed for a second and final five-year term -- there is no way full demobilization can be completed in five years.

When the next elections are held, in five or ten years, no one from the Houphouet Era or the Era of Troubles should be allowed to stand for any office.

Yes, I know, I am living in the realm of fantasy.

But I am far more realistic than anyone who thinks replacing Gbagbo with Ouattara will solve the Ivoirien Crisis. Replacing Bedie with Guei and later Guei with Gbagbo did nothing to resolve the fundamental problem. When there is a problem with the foundation and substance of a thing, you gain nothing by changing the paint or face on its facade.